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We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a
model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when
some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, t e market price is
below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves wel if the price effect
outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is directly related to the degree of
competition. Increased enforcement in this model potentially reduces welfare. The
model is shown to be consistent with evidence on cigarette smuggling in the United
States for 1975-1982.
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I. Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the analysis of smuggling as
an economic phenomenon.1 The seminal paper in this area is by Bhagwati and Hansen
[1973], who examined the welfare effects of smuggling under perfect competition and
monopoly in a two good trade model. They found that smuggling would necessarily reduce
welfare only when smuggling coexisted with legal trade. This spawned a series of articles
which, to a large extent, dealt with when the coexistence of legal trade and smuggling
could be welfare increasing. By introducing a third non-traded good, Sheikh [1974] showed
that smuggling which coexisted with legal trade could be welfare improving. Pitt [1981]
and Martin and Panagariya [1984] obtained the same result by allowing legal trade to
coexist with smuggling when firms camouflage their illegal trade by importing some goods
legally.
The appeal of these recent papers is that they focus on the microeconomic
foundations of the two types of trade coexisting. Pitt's contribution was to show that when
competitive firms smuggle by camouflaging, the condition for zero profits in long run
equilibrium implies a price disparity2 (i.e. a domestic price of imports lower than the
tariff inclusive world price). The model of Martin and Panagariya is particularly
important because it explicitly introduces the uncertain nature of smuggling into the
individual firm's decision problem and shows that the first order conditions for profit
maximization require a price disparity when the probability the firm will be detected
smuggling is a function of the amount it trades legally. The Bhagwati-Hansen (BH) type
of coexistence without price disparity is shown to follow when the probability of detection
depends only on the total amount smuggled.
One of the shortcomings of the Pitt and Martin and Panagariya (hereafter P-MP
models) is that pure legal traders are driven out of the market when smuggling occurs. At
the other extreme, BH type of smuggling allows each firm to either smuggle or trade
legally (but not both). This leaves unexplained the intermediate case of camouflaged
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smuggling by some, but not all, firms in a market.3 This case is more than a theoretical
curiosity. For example, commercial smuggling of cigarettes from low tax to high tax
states for sale in legal retail or vending outlets has been a problem in the United States.
In 1975 ten states reported this type of smuggling as their most serious cigarette tax
evasion problem [ACIR, 1977, p. 10], and the revenue loss to state and local governments
in high tax states from cigarette tax evasion was estimated to be $391 million per year
[ACIR, 1977, p. 1]. The Federal Contraband Cigarette Act of 1978 was enacted because
the problem with commercial smuggling was considered so widespread. It seems unlikely,
however, that all legal outlets were selling contraband cigarettes. Another example of
camouflaged smuggling is misweighing or misinvoicing of imports to avoid customs duties.
There is no reason, a priori, to expect all importers to do this.
In this paper we model an import sector composed of firms in a Cournot industry in
which legal traders can survive along with firms which smuggle through camouflaging as
long as firms differ in their excess cost of smuggling and have some market power. The
model is quasicompetitive in the sense that increasing the number of firms increases
imports and drives the domestic price in equilibrium down to the level that would prevail
under pure competition. The model allows the coexistence of camouflagers and legal
traders, but in the limiting case of pure competition it can be shown to be equivalent to the
P-MP type models. This has the advantage of allowing us to examine how market
structure, as well as enforcement, affect smuggling and welfare. The major results are:
(1) that the price disparity that occurs in models where smuggled trade is camouflaged is
directly related to the degree of competition in the importing industry; (2) since this price
disparity is welfare improving, ceteris paribus, the welfare effect of smuggling in the model
is directly related to the degree of competition as well; and, (3) since the quantity imported
by a camouflager exceeds that of a legal trader, ceteris paribus, an increase in enforcement
may reduce welfare even when enforcement is costless. These results differ markedly
from welfare comparisons arising from coexistence with BH-type smuggling.
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Sections II - VI are theoretical. Because the literature related to our work focuses
on smuggling across national boundaries, the discussion in these sections will do so as well.
The model, however, also applies to smuggling across state lines induced by differential tax
rates, and our empirical analysis will focus on such a case. In Section VII we show that
U.S. cigarette sales for 1975-82 are consistent with our model of camouflaged smuggling.
II. Firm Behavior
Consider an industry with N firms, indexed by i, who behave as Cournot rivals.
Each firm imports and sells domestically a good for which it pays a fixed world price, p*.
We assume that the good is homogeneous and domestic production is zero, so that each
firm faces the inverse demand function P(Q), where Q denotes the total quantity imported
by the N firms. The government levies an ad valorem tariff, t, and provides an
enforcement mechanism at level e in order to deter tariff-avoidance. Firm i can, if it
chooses, attempt to smuggle a fraction 6 of q , the amount it imports. If it does, then the
probability of successfully smuggling a unit is s(9 ,e), which we assume to be decreasing
and concave in both arguments and satisfy s(6O,e)E[0,1] for all 6. and e and s(O,e) = 1 for
all e.
However, there is an additional cost to attempting to smuggle which is paid whether
the firm is successful or not. This cost could be a real cost (from society's point of view)
such as the cost of special packaging or a payment to foreign suppliers to misinvoice, or it
could be a transfer such as a bribe to a customs official to misweigh or to "look the other
way." In general, we would expect this excess cost to vary across firms.4 Those firms
whose managers have more experience are more likely to have established ties with
suppliers or officials and, hence, lower fees. Similarly, they may have better information
regarding the type of enforcement activity so that packaging effort, and therefore cost,
may differ. The same arguments would hold for managers with familial ties to suppliers
and/or officials. To allow for such differences among firrns, we specify a firm specific
4
parameter, y , which with e determines the excess cost of attempting to smuggle. For
simplicity, we assume the total excess cost of smuggling is given by yie&iq . Note that this
specific functional form of total excess smuggling cost is not necessary for our results. The
analysis carries through for any excess cost function which is linear in 8iq and for one
which is convex in6i as long as the second order conditions are appropriately modified.
We chose this form for expositional convenience.
Each firm is assumed to choose q and 65 so as to maximize its expected profit.
Expectations are assumed to be rational, so that 1- s(6 ,e) is the true fraction of 6 q which
is detected and confiscated by the government enforcement mechanism. For simplicity, we
assume that all goods confiscated are resold on the markets and there are no fines, so
that expected profit to firm i is
(1) E II(q, 6) = [s(6 ,e)P(Q)-p* -ye]6.q. + [P(Q)- p*(1+t)](1-6 )q
where q = [q1 ,..,qN] and 6 = [
6i,..., 6N]. Given standard Cournot-Nash behavior, the first
order conditions for an interior solution to this problem are
(2) P(Q)( i s-1 +p*t-lie = 0
(3) [6s+1-69][P(Q)+P'(Q)q]+6.(p*t-yie)-p*(1+t) = 0
Equation (3) has the usual interpretation that a firm will expand imports up to the
point where expected marginal revenue equals marginal cost (assuming the vertical
intercept of the demand function exceeds p*(1 + t)). Given that importation is optimal, it
follows from (2) and the assumptions on s that a firm attempts to camouflage, 6.> 0, if and
only if p*t> ye, which says that profit per unit successfully smuggled exceeds the per unit
cost of smuggling. Whenever p*t>Ty e, the optimal fraction smuggled is determined
uniquely by (2) for any nonnegative vector of imports q and can be written as
f.(q;p*,t,~y.,e), where ofi/Oqi = afi/Oq~ > 0 for all ij=1,...,n, af /fip* > 0, of./t > 0,
ofi/fr; < 0, and afilae< 0. Notice firm i's choice of 65 depends on the actions of its rivals
only though market price, so that a given change in output by any firm (including i) results
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in the same change in 6. because it has the same effect on market price. In particular, an
increase in imports by any firm reduces price and induces each firm to increase the
fraction it attempts to smuggle. This occurs because the marginal gain of switching a legal
unit of imports to an illegal unit, tp, is unaffected by P, but the confiscation loss, (1 - s)P,
declines with P.
These results imply that when smuggling is optimal for firm i, its problem can be
viewed as choosing a level of imports to maximize (1) subject to 6. = f (q;p*,t,ry.,e).
Expected profit can be written as
(4) II(q) = [s(f (q),e)P(Q)-p* -yie]f(q)q +[P(Q)- p*(1 +t)](1-f (q))qi,
in which case the necessary condition for an interior solution is
(5) [s(f (q),e)f (q) + 1- f (q)][P(Q) +P'(Q)q ] = f (q)(p* + 'y e)+(1- f.(q))p*(1 + t).
Given the definition of f (q), (5) is equivalent to (2) and (3). We also assume that (4) is
strictly concave in q for any q_. = (q1 ,..,q _ ,qi +1'"''qn) so a unique maximum exists.
The second implication of afi/Oq > 0 is that even though the world price and per unit
excess smuggling cost are fixed, the average cost of importing is declining in q. This
result is important in determining several comparative static results in Sections III-VI.
Moreover, it prevents us from determining whether marginal cost is increasing in q or not,
which explains why we explicitly assumed II(q) was concave in q1.
Finally, we must impose some restrictions on the inverse demand function to insure
the existence and stability of an industry equilibrium. Assume that there exist real
numbers M and K such that P(0) = M > 0 and P(Q) = 0 for all Q K > 0. Also
assume P'(Q) < 0 and P'(Q) +P"(Q)q~ < 0 for all q e [0,K] and all i. The latter condition
insures that an increase in imports by any other firm reduces (shifts down) the marginal
revenue of firm i and hence the expected marginal revenue of i as well. This is sufficient
to insure the stability of an equilibrium and allows us to do comparative statics. It also
insures that i's expected marginal revenue is decreasing in its own imports. Now we can
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view the industry problem as a game in which each firm's strategy set is [0,K] and its
payoff function is given by (4) if p*t > yie and by (4) evaluated at f (q) = 0 if p*t :5 ye.
Industry equilibrium is then a Nash equilibrium, which is a vector of imports (q ,..,iN)
such that II(q) 11(qiq i) for all E [0,K] and for all i=1,...,N. Existence of an
equilibrium follows immediately (see Theorem 7.1 in Friedman [1977]). The equilibrium
vector of imports simultaneously induces equilibrium fractions smuggled by each firm
(6 ,.7,8N)where 8. = 0 if p*t : yie and B = f (q) E (0,1) if p*t > y e.6
III. Coexistence of Legal Trade and Smuggling
Now suppose there are two types of firms, differentiated only by the parameter yi.
Let N1 firms have y1 and N2 firms have 72 where y and y2 satisfy -y1e < p*t < y2e for
given values of e, p*, and t. Then type 1 firms (with -y) will camouflage and type 2 firms
(with y2) will trade legally whenever it is optimal for both to import. We know that an
equilibrium exists in this case. The interesting question is whether or not there exists an
equilibrium in which both types import. That is, when (if ever) is the equilibrium
characterized by (q1 ,q 2) where =i= > 0 for i=1,...,N1 and q = q2 > 0 for
j=1,...,N2?
Proposition 1: There exist locally stable equilibrium outcomes of this smuggling
game in which one group of firms uses legal trade to camouflage its
smuggling and the remaining firms trade legally.
Proof of Proposition 1: Given y1e < p*t < 7y2e, it need only be shown that there
exist conditions under which both types of firms import positive quantities. Under the
assumptions on expected profit, a necessary and sufficient condition for type 1 firms to
import positive q is
f.(O)[s(f.(0),e)M-p* -7.,e] +(1-f.(O))[M -p*(1 +t)] > 0
1- 1- 11
where 0 is an N-dimensional zero vector. Since f~ (q) is not a function of M, clearly M can
be chosen large enough to satisfy this inequality for any feasible and finite values of the
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parameters of the model. Given that this holds, there exists a q0 such that each
camouflager's first order condition holds at q.- q0E (0,K) in the absence of any legal
traders (type 2 firms). A sufficient condition to insure that some type 2 firms also import
positive quantities is then P(N1q0) > p*(1 +t). This last condition holds for a large class
of demand functions. For example, if demand is linear, then a sufficient condition for
P(N1q
0) > p*(1+t) is given by M > [N 1 p*(1+t)+p*t--y1 e]/(N1 +1). Hence, the result of
this proposition holds for all linear demand functions with vertical intercept M that is
"large enough," and therefore also holds for an open, dense set of demand functions around
each linear demand function for which the result holds. Given existence, local stability
follows from P'(Q) + P"(Q)qi < 0 (which insures the composition of the best response
function of a camouflager with that of a legal trader is less than one in absolute value).
Q.E.D.
The result in Proposition 1 is significant because it provides a new and empirically
plausible explanation for the coexistence of legal trade and smuggling. One group of firms
pays the tariff on all units imported while another distinct group uses its legal trade to
camouflage its smuggling. Two features of the model are necessary to obtain this result.
One, as noted above, is to differentiate firms in such a way that some may find it
profitable to smuggle while others do not. Here we have taken the simple approach of
assuming that some firms have a lower excess smuggling cost than others. The other
feature is allowing the firms to have enough market power that those which operate
legally can survive. As can be seen from the proof, we accomplish this by assuming that
the number of camouflagers (N1) is small enough relative to market demand. Since the
equilibrium price if only camouflaging firms imported would be above p*(1+t), it is
possible for legal traders to operate profitably as well.
This model is quasi-competitive in the sense that increasing the number of
camoufiagers and/or legal traders increases total imports and drives equilibrium price
down to the level that would prevail under pure competition.
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Proposition 2: An increase in the number of legal traders, or camouflagers, or both,
will increase equilibrium output and reduce equilibrium price.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let Qc = N1q 1 +N 2q 2 be equilibrium industry output and
e = f (q) be the fraction that each camouflager attempts to smuggle in equilibrium.
Because camouflagers are identical and Bf /Oqi = of for all i and j, it follows from (2)
that there is no loss of generality in rewriting this as 1 = f(Q c) where f has the same
properties as f1. Then F1(q1,q2) = 0 and F2(q1,q2) = 0 implicitly define q1,q2, and so 91
and Qc ,where
(6) F1(q1,q2 ) = [s(61 ,e)91 + 1-6 1 ][P(Qc)+P'(Qc ) 1 ] -9 1(p*+y 1 e)-(1-
6
1)p*(1+t),
(7) F2 (g1, 2 ) = e c+P(Q ) 2 - p *(1+t).
Standard comparative statics and algebraic manipulation reveal that
(8) aQc/aNi = (se 1 +1-e 1 )q P'(Qc)2 /F
(9) aQ c/aN 2 = (s8 1 +1- 1 )q 2 P'(Qc)2 /F
where F = (aF 1I/q 1)(F 2 Iaq2 ) - (OF 116 2 )(BF 2I q1). The firms' second order sufficient
conditions and P'(Q)+P"(Q)qi<0 imply F>0, so that 8Qc/Ni > 0 and aQc/0N 2 > 0.
Q.E.D.
Suppose we begin in an equilibrium where all firms earn economic profit, or P(Q)e>
p* (1+ t). Then it follows from (7) that free entry of legal traders will drive down
equilibrium price until economic profits from legal trade vanish, or P(Qc) = p* (1+ t).
However, camouflagers will still earn positive profit. It follows from (2), (6), and (7) that
s(Oi,e)P(Qc>p1 _, 1e = (1-asD Ol)P(Qc)-p*(l+t) > 0, so, in fact, camoufiagers break1
even on each unit traded legally and profit on each unit smuggled. At the other extreme,
(6) implies that with free entry of camouflaging firms (i.e. those with lowest excess
smuggling cost, TS) equilibrium price will fall until
1 a 9
(10) 81[s(81,e)P(Qc)1p* ,ie]+ (1- e)[P(Qe)~p*(1+ t)] = 0
-. * -* -*
This requires s(91,e)P(Qc) - p * y1e > 0 > P(Qc)-p*(1+t) so that pure legal traders (y2
firms) are driven out of the market. Qc is equilibrium output when all firms are type 1
firms earning zero economic profit. This limiting case is the market structure studied by
Pitt [1981] and Martin and Panagariya [1984].
IV. Price Disparity
As one might expect, there is a price disparity implied by this model, and it varies
both with the composition of the market and the degree of competition. The measure of
price disparity we analyze is the equilibrium price when all N firms trade legally, P(Q ),
minus equilibrium price when N1 firms camouflage and N2 trade legally, P(Qc). The
equilibrium quantity imported by each firm when all N trade legally is denoted by q,, so
that Q is defined by P(Q)+P'(Q )q = p*(1+t) where Q = Nq . Proposition 3
summarizes the major results for this disparity (i.e. AP = P(Q-) -P(Qc'
Proposition 3: The price disparity increases with (i) an increase in the fraction of
camouflagers in a given industry; (ii) an increase in the number of
camouflagers if demand is linear or if N1 = N 2 and demand is
concave quadratic; and (iii) an equal increase in the number of
camouflagers and legal traders if N1 = N2 and demand is either
linear or concave quadratic.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) Suppose N is increased and N is held constant, so that
dN 1 +dN 2 =0. Then since P(Q ) is unaffected,
~~N constant~~ c [(c/Ni)-c/aN2) I ~ = 1+1-91)P'(c)3(q1 _ 2)/F > 0
since q1 > q2 '
(ii) After some manipulation
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FP'(Q )2q -[(N+ 1)P' (Q )+NP"(Q )](s e +1-8)P'c 3
1 [(N+1)P(Q)+ ( )q ]F
This can be shown to be positive for linear demand with any market composition and for
concave, quadratic demand where N1 = N2 = N/2.
(iii) When N 1 =N 2 = N/2 the expression for OAP/IN simplifies to
2FP'(Q )2qQ -[(N+1)P' (Q )+Q P"(Q-)](s91 +1- 1)( 1 + 2)P'(Qc)
3
ON
2F[(N + 1)P'(Q ,)+Q-P"(Q )]
which is positive for linear and concave quadratic demand.
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that assuming linear demand is not sufficient to
show aAP/N 2 > 0. Q.E.D.
The first statement in Proposition 3 holds because replacing a legal trader with a
camouflager increases Qc, reducing P(Qc), but does not change P(Q ) for given N. On the
other hand, suppose the number of camouflagers increases, so that the number of firms in
the industry also increases. Then from Proposition 2, both P(Qc) and P(Q) decline.
Proposition 3 shows that P(Qc) declines more rapidly (at least for linear demand or for N
= N2 and concave quadratic demand); so the price disparity increases. However, an
increase in the number of legal traders has an ambiguous effect on the price disparity.
Nevertheless, under the conditions stated, an equal increase in the number of camouflagers
and legal traders will cause an increase in the price disparity. Even if an increase in the
number of legal traders does reduce the price disparity, ceteris paribus, a corresponding
increase in the number of camoufiagers will more than offset that effect and the price
disparity will increase.
The intuition behind results (ii) and (iii) is straightforward. With entry, the
marginal revenue of a legal trader and the expected marginal revenue of a camouflager
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shift down. Both types of traders reduce imports, but camouflagers are better able to
protect themselves from entry because they can-drive down average cost by smuggling a
higher fraction (i.e. B61/N > 0).
Figure 1 shows how the results in Proposition 3 relate to the P-MP measure of price
disparity. AP is given by the vertical distance between P(Q ) and P(Qc). The horizontal
axis measures N1, so that, depending on what is assumed about N2 (and therefore N), the
graph can represent results (i), (ii), or (iii). Recalling Proposition 2, notice that AP
converges to the P-MP price disparity for large enough N 1 . That is, P(Qe) declines to
p*(1+t), while P(Qc) declines to P( c); so that AP = a for N=N 1 . Hence the properties
of AP in Proposition (3) are consistent with our observation that in the limit our market
structure is that of P-MP. Notice that when N1> C in Figure 1 the industry is composed
entirely of camouflagers; yet AP < a for N < N1 . That is, the number of firms is still
small enough for each identical firm to make positive economic profit.
Now consider empirical estimates of price disparity. Although AP is a natural
measure of price disparity, empirically observed prices are p * (1 + t) and the market
(domestic) price, P. For N=N1 , PD=p*(1+t) -P correctly estimates P(Q )- P(Qc) For
* -
N < N 1 , p*(
1 + t) does not represent P(Q ), so that the measure of price disparity used in
previous literature will underestimate AP. However, the relation between P(Qc) and
p* (1 + t) can be used to assess the extent of smuggling activity. As N>C,
P(Qc) > p*(1 + t). For N < C, only low cost firms smuggle, while for N > C all firms in
the industry smuggle. This means that, independent of market structure, a positive value
of PD indicates that every firm is camouflaging.
If PD is negative or zero, inferences must be based on a combination of its value
and other evidence on smuggling. This is because the observed price may be either P(Q )
or P(Qc ). A negative value of PD is consistent with either no smuggling (i.e. the market
price is P(Q )) or N < C and low cost firms conduct a portion of their trade illegally (i.e.
the market price is P(Qc)). As is clear from the Figure, an estimated zero price disparity
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either indicates N = C and firms camouflaging or no camouflaging and N = N1 . Only for
positive estimates will it be clear that smuggling through camouflaging is occurring, and in
this case all firms are smuggling.
VI. Competition and Welfare
The existence of a price disparity in the model leads to the possibility that smuggling
relative to legal trade can be welfare improving. As in Pitt, when the excess smuggling
cost is merely a transfer to the government, then smuggling improves welfare via the price
disparity. The results of the last section indicate that this welfare improvement is
maximized when there is free entry of camouflagers. If, on the other hand, there is a real
excess smuggling cost, the welfare effect of smuggling depends on the relative magnitudes
of the excess cost and lower price due to camouflaging. Here again, the welfare effect of
smuggling will depend on the degree of competition. While the price disparity is
maximized with free entry of camouflagers, free entry will drive up total excess smuggling
cost because entry leads to an increase in the equilibrium quantity firms try to smuggle.
The following proposition characterizes the impact of a change in the number of firms on
welfare.
Proposition 4: An increase in the number of camouflagers will reduce welfare
whenever y1 e81[1 + (N1161)(5X1/N 1)] -P(Qc) -p*, but an increase
in the number of legal traders will increase welfare if
Te1(N/81) (8f/BN ) P(Qc)-p* where
Bi9/0N1 = (af1/aN1)(1/g 1)(oQc/aN1 ).
Proof of Proposition 4: We assume demand comes from a utility function that can
be approximated by U = U(Q) +m, where m is consumption of a competitively produced
composite commodity, so that welfare is correctly measured by the standard surplus
measures. Hence, welfare is consumer surplus plus expected profits plus expected
government revenue from tariff collections and confiscations. Expected profits plus
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government revenue can be shown to be [P(Qc) c p*]Q yieS -K(e) where S = 1 N1q1 is
total quantity firms attempt to smuggle and K(e) is the cost of enforcement. Therefore
(11) W = JcP(Q)dQ-p*Qc-71eS-K(e)
Standard comparative statics and algebraic manipulation yield
- [P(Qp* - 71e61{1 +(N/I9 1 9 1/8N )]q + -[ e 1* - e 1 ]N /ON )w (1Q)1p
where p * + 1e by the first order necessary conditions of camouflagers and
0q1 /8N 1 < 0. Hence < 0 if P(Qc)p* -7 1 e6[1+(N%1)991N 1 )] 0, which
N1
proves the stated result for camouflagers.
Similarly, one can show
= cP(Qcp 712e (N 1 q 1/q2) c/2 71 1Na 2
using the fact that 891 /0N2 = (cif/ON2 )(OQc/aN 2 )/q2 . Since (Oq1/N 2) < 0 < (aQc/aN2)'
OW/N 2 > 0 if (N 1q11q 2)(f/ON2) c(P(Q)- 1e.Observing that q=(f/aN2)
q2 (8f/8N1), this last inequality can be written as that in the statement of the proposition.
Q.E.D.
An increase in the number of camouflagers expands total imports at the margin,
where total excess cost increases through two effects. One is the additional excess cost of
the import increase, y 1e61, and the other is the additional cost from smuggling a higher
fraction of imports, (y 1e6 1N 1 /91(OG 1/N). If the sum of these exceeds the increase in
consumer surplus at the margin, then the subsequent loss in profits and government
revenue is large enough for welfare to decline. Because an increase in the number of legal
traders affects eiin a fashion symmetric to that of an increase in camouflagers, we can
state the condition for this to increase welfare in terms of Of/ON1. With an increase in
legal traders, consumer surplus and government revenue both increase, and the condition




In a similar fashion, the welfare effects of increasing enforcement will depend on
whether or not it increases real smuggling costs and on the elasticity of the fraction
smuggled by a camouflager. An increase in enforcement will reduce both the fraction
smuggled by each camouflager and total imports, increasing price and reducing and
consumer surplus in equilibrium. Then if y1 represents a transfer to the government, an
increase in enforcement reduces welfare. If, however, y1 represents real resources devoted
to camouflaging, then an increase in enforcement can improve welfare since it reduces the
total amount of imports smuggled, and so the total excess smuggling cost. Proposition 6
summarizes the results for this case.
Proposition 5 summarizes the comparative statics results needed to prove
Proposition 6. Comparative statics results for changes in t and p * are also given. The
proof is omitted because it is straightforward and not informative.
Proposition 5:
Proposition 6:
An increase in either e or -y reduces q1, Q1 , S, Qc, and AP but
increases q2 and PQc). An increase in t increases q and reduces
q2, but the effect on all other equilibrium values is ambiguous. All
effects of a change in p* are ambiguous.
An increase in the level of enforcement (excess smuggling cost of a
camouflager) reduces welfare if the equilibrium fraction smuggled by
a camouflager is inelastic with respect to the level of enforcement
(excess smuggling cost).
Proof of Proposition 6: It follows from (11) that
aw
[P(Q )P*]Q oe) 71 + -K'(e). Since 8Q /Be < 0 and the marginal cost
ce c c AIMS ~.J~;c
-of enforcement, K'(e), must be nonnegative, a sufficient condition for 8W/de < 0 is
- 8W - -~/S +eg > 0, or -(e/S)(8s/te) s 1. Similarly, =OeQ) pIa~
i g 15
e - 1 is negative if - ('y1 /S) (67Si-y 1) 1. Since aS/ae : 0 and OS/By1 < 0, the
statement of the proposition follows immediately under the convention of writing
elasticities as positive numbers. Q.E.D.
An increase in the level of enforcement causes each camouflager to reduce imports
since its expected marginal revenue shifts down and its marginal cost shifts up. This
raises price and leads legal traders to expand imports, but the net effect is fewer total
imports, less smuggling, and a higher price. Welfare is reduced unless the resulting loss in
consumer surplus is offset by a reduction in total excess smuggling cost. If the fraction
smuggled is inelastic with respect to enforcement, the welfare increase from lower total
excess smuggling cost (due to the lower fraction smuggled) is not large enough to offset the
loss in consumer surplus. An increase in 'Y shifts the camouflagers' marginal costs up,
causing them to reduce imports with the same effects on equilibrium values, and therefore
welfare, as a change in e.
Finally, it is worth noting why we cannot obtain welfare results for changes in the
tariff and world price. Recalling Proposition 5, an increase in the tariff causes
camouflagers to increase imports and legal traders to decrease imports. Legal traders
reduce imports because their marginal cost shifts up. Camouflagers' marginal cost shifts
up also, but to a lesser extent since they also increase the fraction they try to smuggle.
Increasing the fraction smuggled increases expected marginal revenue enough to outweigh
this effect, so each camouflager expands imports. The net effect on equilibrium total
imports, smuggling, and the price are uncertain. Although the effects of an increase in the
world price are very similar to those of an increase in the tariff, we cannot determine how
any equilibrium values change when p* changes. The difference is that an increase in t
increases camouflagers' marginal cost only through their legal imports, while an increase
in p * increases marginal cost through legal and illegal imports.
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VII. Empirical Analysis
In this section we consider the empirical relevance of this type of smuggling.
Pitt's original model was developed to explain the observed price disparity for Indonesian
exports of rubber. Branson and Macedo [1987] examine the black market premium
related to Pitt-type smuggling in the Sudan. Norton [1988] developed a model similar to
Pitt's to explain pig smuggling between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. All
of these studies assume perfect competition. In this section we consider situations where
this assumption may not be warranted.
An obvious example is where governments restrict entry through import licenses.
Smuggling is generally regarded as prevalent in Indonesia, and recent data for Indonesia
show that of 5229 traded commodity classifications, 1484 were under license and only 296
of these were subject to quotas (Pangestu, [1987]). 1360 of these items were
manufactures such as steel, textiles, machinery, pharmaceuticals, and plastics. A natural
question to ask is whether licensing is merely a technicality, or whether there are indeed
few firms in the market. In the case of polyester and rayon fibers, the government
recently liberalized the licensing procedure so that six state trading companies are allowed
to import fibers rather than the previous sole importer (Pangestu, p.32). The right to
import plastics is restricted to three firms (Pangestu, p. 34).
Interstate cigarette smuggling in the U. S. is another likely candidate for our
model. Different cigarette taxes across states provide the incentive for this smuggling, and
it has been considered a major problem by state and local governments since the early
1970s. There is also evidence that cigarette industry structure is neither collusive nor
perfectly competitive (Manchester [1973], Sumner [1981], Appelbaum [1982], and
Sullivan [1985]).7 Recalling that our model allows for a variety of market outcomes
(both in terms of competition and degree of illegal activity), it is a natural choice for
examining domestic trade of cigarettes.
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In Sections A and B we focus on the cigarette example. The primary reason is
that price data needed to examine the extent of smuggling are readily available for
cigarettes. We present evidence that camouflaged smuggling is widespread enough to be
statistically significant in a regression framework. Moreover, empirical estimates of price
disparity are consistent with the view that some, but not all, firms in the market smuggle.
A. Industry Smuggling Characteristics
Cigarette smuggling practices include consumers crossing state lines for personal
consumption purchases, as well as smuggling of cigarettes by wholesalers and retailers for
resale in retail or vending outlets. While we account for casual smuggling in our empirical
estimates, our interest is primarily in the latter. The exact mechanism for commercial
(organized) smuggling varies, but it generally involves distributors or retailers in high tax
states purchasing cigarettes from a wholesaler in a low tax state. The state tax in the low
tax state is paid, but the wholesaler is paid a premium not to affix any tax indicia to the
cigarettes. The distributor or retailer in the high tax state then uses a counterfeit tax
stamp to evade the higher tax. Enforcement evidence suggests the bulk of these purchases
are made in North Carolina and some in Kentucky [ACIR, 1977 and 1985].
There are a number of empirical studies of cigarette smuggling. The Advisory
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR 1977, 1985] estimated the revenue loss
to high tax states from all forms of cigarette smuggling to be $390 million in 1975. A
demand equation for cigarettes was estimated using data from non-smuggling states and
used to predict cigarette consumption in smuggling states. Comparing the estimates with
legal sales (that is, tax paid cigarette sales) gave a measure of the extent of smuggling.
Since the ACIR's interest was in revenue loss regardless of the form of smuggling, it did
not attempt to differentiate between casual and commercial smuggling. Other studies
finding significant smuggling effects are Manchester [1973], Baltagi and Levin [1986], and
Baltagi and Goel [1987]. These studies, like the ACIR study, do not provide evidence on
the extent of casual versus commercial smuggling.
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Like the ACIR, we examine how the presence of smuggling affects demand
estimation.8 But we differ by using data from smuggling as well as non-smuggling
states, and we account for smuggling with regressors expected to be sensitive to the
different forms of smuggling. To differentiate between the two forms of smuggling, we
rely on the fact that casual smuggling is predominantly consumers crossing into adjoining
low tax states to purchase cigarettes from retail outlets while commercial smuggling is
predominantly trucking of large quantities of cigarettes purchased from wholesalers in
North Carolina and, to a lesser extent, Kentucky.
Before turning to our estimation strategy, several additional facts need to be
mentioned. First, consumers who purchase commercially smuggled cigarettes are
unaware, in general, that they are purchasing contraband goods. Second, the measure of
cigarette sales available on a state by state basis is the quantity of cigarettes for which the
local state taxes have been paid. That is, actual quantity demanded in the ith state at
time t, Qit, is the sum of observable legal or tax-paid cigarette sales, Lit, and commercially
smuggled cigarettes, 1it. Cigarettes smuggled by consumers from adjoining states are
substitutes for locally available cigarettes, Qit'
Consider a standard demand equation for cigarettes
Qit=0 + 1RPt + #62 INCit + ,83 t + p4AVRPit + #5Qit-1 + e
where i refers to the state, t refers to the time period, Q is tax paid cigarette sales, RP is
retail price, INC is income, and AVRP is the average retail price in neighboring states.
We include a time trend to control for declining cigarette sales in response to advertised
health hazards of smoking. AVRP is the average price of cigarettes in neighboring states
and accounts for casual smuggling. In the presence of commercial smuggling, we can
substitute Qt= Lit + Iit into the above and rearrange to form
(12) Lt = it+ pyiRPit + /32INCt + #3t + I34AVRPit + #65Lit-1 + ut
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where uit 5Iit1 - Iit + Et. In the absence of commercial smuggling, uit eit is a
zero mean disturbance uncorrelated with the regressors. But with commercial smuggling,
the disturbance uit is no longer a zero mean disturbance and can be expected to be related
to smuggling activity. That is, an appropriately specified equation for Lit would either
include Iit and Iit-1, or determinants of those variables.
To determine whether commercial smuggling exists we need to determine whether
uit is a classical disturbance uncorrelated with determinants of Iit or a non-classical
disturbance correlated with determinants of Iit. We proceed by regressing Lit on the
demand variables plus the difference in tax rates between state i and North Carolina
(TAXDIFit). In the absence of smuggling the estimated coefficient of TAXDIF should not
be significantly different from zero; in the presence of smuggling the estimated coefficient
should be significantly different from zero. It should be noted that the sign of TAXDIF is
indeterminant because of other excluded variables when smuggling occurs (enforcement,
etc.) and because of interaction of TAXDIF, the excluded variables, and the demand
variables.
Instrumental variables estimation is used because of possible simultaneity due to
the presence of RP as a regressor in (12). As instrument for RP we use the predicted
value of RP in a regression of RP on the regressors in (12) as well as TAXDIF, a dummy
variable to reflect the enactment of the Federal Cigarette Contraband Act of 1978, the
state cigarette tax rate, the wholesale price plus the federal excise tax, and an index of the
wage rate of grocery store workers. Data are annual for the period 1975-82 for 29 states.
We exclude North Carolina and Kentucky because they are a source for commercially
smuggled cigarettes, as well as states with local cigarette taxes, states with more than 5
percent of sales on Indian reservations, and states with at least 5 percent military. The
latter two sets of states are excluded because cigarette sales on military and Indian
reservations are exempt from state taxes, hence a potential for intrastate smuggling
exists. Finally, we exclude Utah because of the high proportion of Mormons in that state.
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A total of 232 observations are used. Tax paid sales and income are per capita. We use
both a linear and a log-log version of the model with the results given in Table 1.
Retail price, lagged (legal) sales, and trend have expected signs and are
significant. We find income insignificant, as do Baltagi and Levin. While there is
anecdotal evidence that casual smuggling occurs and some authors have found it to be
statistically important (though of small effect - see Baltagi and Levin and Manchester),
we find it to be statistically unimportant. On the other hand, the statistical significance of
TAXDIF indicates that commercial smuggling is pervasive. Only if Iit is substantial would
TAXDIF be expected to be significant in an equation describing consumer behavior.
B. Empirical Price Disparity
For some of the states in the sample, cigarettes are primarily smuggled in, while
for others there is no smuggling or cigarettes are smuggled out. In this section, we focus
on price disparity in states where cigarettes are primarily smuggled into the state.
Combined with our results on the importance of commercial smuggling, the observed price
disparity can be used to indicate whether all firms are smuggling.
In Section IV we discussed the information contained in the sign of observed price
disparity, PD = p*(1+t) - P. To give empirical content to the measure in the cigarette
case, several adjustments are made in calculating PD. Since the cigarette tax is per unit
rather than ad valorem, the first term in PD is replaced by p* + t.9 For the cigarette
case, p* is the wholesale price plus distribution costs and federal excise tax.
Our measure of the cigarette price disparity for the ith in-smuggling state at time
t is
(13) PD.t =WPt + FT +ST it+ D. - RP.
where
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WP is the wholesale price at time t (equal for all states)
FT is the federal excise tax (equal to $.08 for all observations)
ST is the state tax
D is a measure of distribution cost, and
RP is retail price.
Because direct data are unavailable, we construct a measure of distribution cost
based on observed markup in states with no in-smuggling. Observed markup for the jth
non-smuggling state is (RPjt - WPt FT - STj), so that it includes factor costs and
profits. As is appropriate for a state with no smuggling, this measure implies a zero
observed price disparity in the jth state at time t. Barring differences in factor costs or
market structure across states, this markup would proxy distribution costs in the absence
of smuggling. However, factor costs do differ across states, and to account for this we
weight the markup by an index of relative wage rates. Since the primary factor cost in
cigarette retailing is labor,10 we use wage rates of grocery store workers. In (13), then,
Dit = (RPjt - WPt - FT - STjt it
where WIijt is the ratio of wage rates in j to those in i.
Ideally we would calculate markup using states not engaged in any form of
smuggling (in or out), but we cannot be certain which (if any) states fall in that catagory.
We initially choose North Carolina and Kentucky as the "base" states since it is known
that only out-smuggling occurs there. A second base group is composed of states for which
we have strong priors that no commercial smuggling occurs. States in this group have
state taxes within 10 cents per pack of the North Carolina tax (taxes are averages over
the period and stated in 1982 prices). In all exercises we exclude from consideration states
with large American Indian and military populations as well as Utah and states with local
taxes.I
In a 1975 survey [ACIR, 1977], six of the states in our sample indicated that
smuggling by stamp counterfeiting was a serious problem. We calculated the price
disparity in those states for each of the 8 years in our sample. Using the North Carolina
and Kentucky markup, the price disparity is positive in only 7 of the 48 cases. Using
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average markup in our "perceived no-smuggling" states, the price disparity is positive in
only 16 cases.
We also examine price disparity for states whose average tax rates were at least 20
cents per pack above the N.C. tax (seven states). This selection criterion does not
discriminate between commercial and casual smuggling, but it does capture states with the
greatest incentive to smuggle (either commercially or casually). Using the North Carolina-
Kentucky markup base, the price disparity is positive in one-third of the cases. For the
second markup base, the price disparity is positive in 48 percent of the cases.
To summarize, we observe a negative price disparity in the majority of cases
examined. In the context of previous models of camouflaging, this result would be
inconsistent with the presence of smuggling. But we know from enforcement and
statistical evidence that commercial smuggling is a prevalent phenomenon. Our model
allows the interpretation that some, but not all, firms in the industry smuggle.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
BH is the only study prior to this one to examine the welfare effects of smuggling
with varying degrees of competition. This paper provides an analysis of smuggling and
market power when smuggling occurs through camouflaging. The advantage of the model
is that it includes both the realistic type of smuggling modelled by P-MP and BH's equally
realistic notion of different firms conducting the two types of trade (i.e. smuggling and
legal trade). We have shown that the coexistence of two types of firms is precluded if and
only if there is free entry of firms capable of camouflaging. In particular, if the smuggling
technology and enforcement effort make camouflaging profitable for only a small number
of firms, then even in the long run we could observe some firms trading legally and others
camouflaging.
Unlike BH, however, coexistence in this model can be welfare improving. Here, as
in P-MP, this is due to the price disparity implied by the first order conditions for
camouflagers. As one might expect, this disparity and therefore the welfare effects of
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smuggling are related to the degree of competition in the market. In BH's case of
coexistence (where smugglers do not camouflage), monopoly was preferred to perfect
competition (since with no price disparity "the fewer smugglers, the better" p. 184). Here
we obtain the more conventional result that welfare is higher the more firms there are
whenever there is no real excess smuggling cost. When there is a real excess cost to
smuggling, the welfare effects depend on the extent to which increased competition
increases excess smuggling costs.
Finally, we show that observed price disparity with camouflaging can be positive
or negative. In previous models, camouflaged smuggling produced a positive disparity.
This followed because the analysis was restricted to perfect competition. In a more
general setting, camouflaging can occur with negative observed disparity when not all
firms smuggle. Our empirical evidence on commercial cigarette smuggling in the U.S. is
consistent with this being the case.
University of Kentucky
Purdue University
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Footnotes
1The text cites work directly related to ours. Studies of somewhat related illegal
activities are Ethier's [1986] analysis of illegal immigration and Grossman and Shapiro's
[1988] study of counterfeit product trade. The analysis of smuggling has also been related
to currency convertibility issues by Macedo [1987]. For an interesting discussion and
analysis of smuggling in West Africa, see Stolper and Deardorff [1988]. For a survey of
tax evasion issues, see Skinner and Slemrod [1985].
2The price disparity in Pitt's certainty model can be derived from the firm's first
order conditions (see his equation (2a)) as well as the zero profit condition.
3Norton [1988] develops a model for smuggling of agricultural goods. Firms in his
model decide the allocation of a given quantity between domestic and foreign illegal and
legal sales. Their desire to smuggle is based on their distance from the border. In
principle, this could lead to a variety of market outcomes, but he does not examine the
market equilibrium.
4Assuming different excess costs is the easiest way to introduce heterogeneity into
this model. The desired result could be obtained as well by assuming different probabilities
of success functions for the firms, but the analysis is much more cumbersome in this case.
5We abstract from issues related to why the tariff is imposed. If the tariff were
imposed to restrict consumption or to encourage production, resale of confiscated goods
would not be an ideal assumption. If, however, revenue maximization is the government's
goal, the resale assumption is not a problem.
6Because we are interested in camouflaging (such as underinvoicing), we do not
consider the possibility that 9. = 1. Formally this can be ruled out by assuming s(1,e) = 0
for e > 0.
7 Available data do not allow tests of market power at separate stages of cigarette
marketing. Both the cited studies and ours treat the market as the combined system of
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. Nonetheless, the studies of market power
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presume that the major scope for exercise of monopoly power is at the manufacturing
level. Although their methods differ, these studies tend to reject both the cartel and
perfect competition hypotheses. This is the case most appropriate for our model since we
specify an arbitrary number of non-colluding firms.
Since data are for all cigarettes, both these studies and ours abstract from
product differentiation. Explicitly introducing product differentiation to our theoretical
model should produce similar results as long as the firms' choice variables are quantities.
Alternatively, one could interpret the model in terms of smuggling a particular brand.
8For specific functional forms of demand, one could use (6) and (7) to solve for q
and q2. With data on N1 and N2 , one could directly estimate the legal sales equation
implied by our model.
9For fixed p , results in Sections II - VI are the same qualitatively with either a
per unit or ad valorem tax.
10Initially we thought transportation cost would be an important cost and thus affect
smuggling incentives. Apparently, it is a minor cost. Input-output data for 1977
[Department of Commerce, 1984] show that transportation cost accounted for .5 percent of
the value of tobacco products. More recently, an undisclosed cigarette company official told
us that in 1984 average transportation cost amounted to .6 cents per pack of cigarettes.
1 1States with military bases and Indian reservations are subject to another type of
smuggling which would bias the legal sales data. Utah is excluded because of the large
Mormon population. The state tax rate would not reflect the effective tax for states with
local taxes. An effective tax rate could be calculated using data on local sales and local tax
rates. Smuggling incentives are affected by these local tax rates, so that the local and rest




Table 1. Cigarette Demand Equation Results
Variable Linear Model Log-Log Model
Constant 22.66 (3.37)** .24 (3.57)**
Retail Price -26.76 (-1.90)* -1.14 (-1.92)*
Income -1.14 (-.56) -1.01 (-.72)
Average Price Neighboring States 7.96 (.93) .03 (.70)
Trend -. 61 (-4.33)** -. 005 (-4.91)**
Lagged Sales .96 (78.49)** .97 (75.94)**
Tax Difference with NC 17.94 (1.67)* .02 (1.97)**
R2 .98 .98
t-ratios given in parentheses
* Significant at 10% level
* * Significant at 5% level
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